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Abstract
We explain why some organizations cohere around a mission, with members
having similar mission preferences, whereas other organizations allow their mis-
sion to be contested by members whose preferences differ. Like in earlier work,
coherence aligns interests over missions. But in contrast to previous work, this
alignment comes at the cost of lower motivation: when resources are scarce
and when members care about similar missions there is a free riding problem.
This tradeoff between mission alignment and free riding determines the optimal
mission structure. We draw on several case studies of government agencies to
support our theory.
1 Introduction
In many organizational settings, it is reasonable to think that workers are motivated
by factors besides monetary incentives. For example, it is odd to think of a teacher
who places no value on the education of her students, or an environmental activist
with no concern for the state of the environment. We say that these workers have
a sense of mission; they care about the outcomes their organization produces, and
they have preferences about the best way to achieve these outcomes. Thus it is
natural to think of mission as a tool which the head of an organization can use to
provide incentives.
Mission, however, is used very differently across organizations. Consider the
National Forest Service (NFS) and the National Park Service (NPS) — two U.S.
government agencies, each responsible for managing large tracts of land. In the
NFS, new recruits who are selected carefully, undergo rigorous training and are
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immediately indoctrinated in the ways of professional forest management, to ensure
that their performance is always in line with the overarching goal of the organization.
In fact, as Herbert Kaufman notes in his study of the NFS, foresters are if anything,
“too zealous in their conformance” towards organizational policy.1 We term such
a setting where members’ values are perfectly aligned with each other as one of
mission coherence.
To compare, there is often conflict within the NPS over the proper way to manage
these resources. Arguably, this is driven by an “inherent duality” in the self-stated
purpose of the organization, which is to both “conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects” whilst at the same time “providing for the [public’s] enjoyment”
of these natural resources. With proponents on both sides of this argument within
the organization, a question as simple as “Should this section of trees be cut back
to enable easier access to camping grounds?” can be hotly debated (Goodsell (2011)
pp.111-112.). Where the values of members within an organization are competing,
we say there exists mission contestation.
In this paper, we compare these two mission structures from the point of view
of providing incentives for workers. The prevailing view is that coherence is a more
effective incentive instrument. As James Q. Wilson, in his book Bureaucracy (pp.
109), puts it, “the great advantage of a mission is that it permits the head of the
agency to be more confident that operators will act in particular cases in ways that
the head would have acted had he or she been in their shoes.” He also notes that
(pp. 370) having a distinct mission, “permits the executive to economize on scarce
incentives (people want to do certain tasks even though there are no special rewards
for doing it).”
These views on the optimality of mission coherence as an incentive instrument
are also echoed in economic theories. After all, differences in preferences across par-
ties are the very reason agency problems arise. Besley and Ghatak (2005) show that
mission coherence increases a worker’s reward for effort and thus acts as a cheaper
(though equally effective) alternative to monetary incentives. In Dewatripont, Je-
witt, and Tirole (1999), having “clarity of mission” with a smaller set of tasks
improves a labor market’s inference about a worker’s talent and thus induces more
effort. And finally, alignment in preferences over projects (or congruence) helps
explain why real authority is delegated to workers in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
Our main message in this paper, in contrast to earlier work, is that contestation
may be optimally chosen over coherence to provide incentives. In particular, it helps
overcome free riding which arises naturally in mission oriented settings. To make
this point, we construct a principal-agent model where coherence is optimal under
some settings and contestation under others. We then use our model to better
understand observed mission structures in government agencies.
In our setting, a principal (the head of an organization) needs to allocate scare
funds towards projects where each project corresponds to a distinct mission. As an
1See Kaufman (1960), pp. 4-5.
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example, an organization devoted to aiding development in third-world countries
can use its money to build a school, or to improve access to fresh water, or to set
up a micro-finance institution. Agents (workers) are hired to develop projects: that
is they select a project to work on and exert effort on it. Benefits from a project
are realized only when a project is successfully developed and funded.
With a single agent, the benefits of coherence are clear. When the preferred
mission of the principal and agent coincide, an agent selects a project which gives
the maximum benefit to both himself and the principal. This selected project also
maximizes the agent’s reward from working hard and thus improves incentives for
effort. As a result, coherence is always optimal in the single agent setting.
With multiple agents, coherence still leads to better aligned interests over mis-
sions. But – and this is the main insight of our paper– this comes at the cost of
lower effort: when there are many agents and when resources are limited so that
only a subset of projects successfully developed can be implemented, mission coher-
ence leads to free riding. This is because when agents care about similar missions,
there is a public goods problem: an implemented project brings intrinsic benefit to
all agents and not just the agent responsible for its development. Allowing agents
to differ in their preferences helps resolve free riding for two reasons. First, mission
is less of a public good and second, agents have an incentive to compete with each
other over scarce resources.
This tradeoff between better aligned interests over missions and free riding de-
termines the optimal mission structure. We find that contestation is more likely
when resources are scarce in an organization and when the intrinsic benefit from
a mission is high for the principal. Coherence, on the other hand, is more likely
when the intrinsic benefit is high for an agent and when the principal is less tolerant
of missions other than his preferred one. Drawing on a large body of case studies
of government agencies, we use our theory to explain why we observe coherence in
some government agencies and contestation in others.
In many mission oriented organizations, workers pursue missions they are in-
clined towards. Yet there are examples where workers suppress their personal pref-
erences and instead target a mission that appeals to their superiors.2 Our framework
provides a simple explanation based on authority for why this pandering may arise.
When scarce resources are allocated by a superior, competition amongst workers
induces them to pander to a superior by selecting projects closer to the superi-
ors preferred mission. This explanation for pandering which relies on competition
amongst agents for scarce resources is distinct from other approaches in the litera-
ture (Prendergast (1993), Che, Dessein, and Kartik (2013)).
As mentioned earlier, there are other papers that examine incentive provision in
mission oriented organizations. Besley and Ghatak (2005) consider a setting with a
2For example, when the Labour party came to power in Great Britain in 1945, they were able
to successfully carry out their policies even though most of the civil servants were thought to be
conservatives.
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single agent and where wages have a lower bound (a limited liability constraint) and
find that coherence economizes on costly monetary incentives. Our paper illustrates
a key difference between monetary and mission based incentives: the former is a
private good whereas the latter has public good features which lead to free riding.
Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) consider a career concerns framework and
show that limiting the subset of tasks that an agent performs (which they term
mission clarity) makes inferences by a labor market less noisy which in turn induces
effort.
There are also other papers that examine the benefits of heterogeneity in orga-
nizations. In Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) heterogeneity in preferences over
projects between a decision maker and an implementer helps the decision maker to
commit to use information about a project’s profitability. This in turn improves
incentives for the implementer to exert effort. In Van den Steen (2010), hetero-
geneity in prior beliefs makes agency problems worse but leads to more information
acquisition by an agent to convince a principal. Dewatripont and Tirole (2005)
consider a setting where parties bear private costs to communicate with each other
and examine a tradeoff between congruence of preferences and free riding. Prender-
gast (2007) shows how the bias of an agent depends on the alignment of interests
between a client and a principal. And finally in Prendergast (2008), the benefits of
heterogeneity in an organization arise from the fact that agents are specialized in
their tasks.
The public good feature of missions which is central to our paper also plays a
role in Francois (2007). He considers a setting where the production of a public
good in an organization requires i) filling a job slot with a worker and ii) the worker
putting in effort. He shows that in this setting, more intrinsically motivated agents
have an incentive to apply for the job to prevent less intrinsically motivated agents
from occupying the job slot. This incentive to make a difference, however, reduces
when performance related pay is available. The key difference is that workers are
vertically differentiated in his setting (with only a single public good) whereas in our
set up workers are horizontally differentiated over multiple missions. Furthermore,
firms hire workers randomly in his setting.
The distinction in our model between a project development phase and a funding
phase also plays a role in Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) and in Rantakari (2013).
Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) show how incentive schemes that are contingent on a
funded project, create ex-post distortions in project funding, which in turn influence
ex-ante incentives for effort. They then go on to show how focussing on a narrow
set of activities helps alleviate the ex-ante incentive problem. Rantakari (2013), on
the other hand, shows how favoring one agent in the funding phase is better for a
principal relative to treating agents equally. Both of these papers do not focus on
the degree of heterogeneity in organizations, and distortions in their set up arise
from explicit incentive schemes whereas distortions in our paper arise from mission
being a public good.
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In her review paper on altruism, Rose-Ackerman (1996) argues that motivation
should be thought of along more than one dimension. For example, while two
teachers might be passionate about the education of their students (i.e. both are
intrinsically motivated), they may have very different views about the best way to
provide this education, or even what constitutes a good education. Delfgaauw and
Dur (2007) explore how heterogeneity and intrinsic motivation interact in a model
where a firm must screen a heterogeneous pool of intrinsically motivated agents in
order to fill a position. They show that, while posting a lower wage will discourage
less motivated agents from applying, it will also increase the chance that the position
is not filled. However, like Francois (2007), they assume that agents differ in their
level of intrinsic motivation, and not in their missions. Moreover, they choose to
model the intrinsic motivation as “impure altruism”; thus workers derive utility
directly from exerting effort, and not from the output of the firm, sidestepping the
public goods problem entirely.
2 Model
Our description of the model is split into four parts: i) the production process, ii)
preferences over missions, iii) the set of feasible contracts, and iv) the timing and
information of the game.
First consider the production process. There is a risk neutral principal (P) who
must hire two risk-neutral agents (A1 and A2) to produce output. Production has
two phases. The first phase is a project development phase. In this phase, each
agent selects a type of project to develop (m˜1 and m˜2) from the interval [−1, 1],
where each project corresponds to a distinct mission, and each agent exerts effort
(e1 and e2) on their selected project. The type of project and effort are chosen
simultaneously by both agents. Within the context of the NPS example, think of
projects to the left end of the interval as conservation-type projects and projects
towards the right end of the interval as recreation-type projects. Also, think of
effort as data gathering, conducting research, assessment of needs and opportunities,
working out logistics, evaluation of methods, and budgeting. The level of effort of an
agent equals the probability that his project is successfully developed. Let 0 denote
failure on a project and 1 denote a success. The probabilities of success on a project
are independent of one another. Effort is costly for the agent and the cost function
C is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex, with
C(0) = 0.
If no projects are successful, P, A1 and A2, each get a benefit of 0. If, on the
other hand, at least one project is successfully developed, we move to the second
phase of production which is the funding phase. In this phase, resources (or funds)
have to be allocated to a successfully developed project for it to yield benefits to
anyone. The parameter r, which takes two values, 0 or 1, measures the level of
resources in the organization. When r = 1, resources are plenty and up to two
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successful projects can be funded. When r = 0, on the other hand, resources are
scarce and at most one project can be funded.
The principal and agents are characterized by their mission which is their loca-
tion on the interval [−1, 1]. We denote the principal’s mission as mP (which is nor-
malized to 0) and the missions of the agents hired as m1 and m2. Since the principal
chooses who to hire, m1 and m2 are endogenous.
3 Without any loss of generality, we
assume that m1 ≤ m2. Also, to characterize the optimal location of agents without
running up against boundary constraints, we assume that m2 −m1 ≤ 1.
Suppose that a project of type m˜ is successfully developed and funded. Final
payoffs of the principal and agents are as follows4:
UP = B − D(|mP − m˜|)
τP
− w1 − w2
UA1 = b−D(|m1 − m˜|) + w1 − C(e1)
UA2 = b−D(|m2 − m˜|) + w2 − C(e2).
B > 0 is the benefit that P gets if a project corresponding to mP is successfully
funded. Projects corresponding to other missions yield diluted benefits for the prin-
cipal. This is captured by the function D which is defined on the distance between
the principal’s mission and a successfully funded project. We assume that D ≥ 0,
D(0) = 0 and that D is strictly increasing, convex, and differentiable. The scale
parameter τP ∈ [0,∞] is a measure of the principal’s mission tolerance, i.e. how
receptive the principal is to missions other than his own.
Likewise, b > 0 is the benefit that an agent gets if a project corresponding to
his mission is successfully funded. And once again, the dilution in benefits for other
projects is captured by the function D. Notice that to keep the model simple, we
have normalized the tolerance parameters of both agents to 1.
w1 and w2 are the wages paid to A1 and A2. Agents and the principal have a
reservation utility of 0.
The following variable plays an important role in our analysis.
Definition 1. ∆ ≡ m2 −m1.
∆ is a measure of heterogeneity across agents (i.e. how far apart agents are in
their preferences over missions). As we will see later in the paper, ∆ has alterna-
tive interpretations as i) a measure of heterogeneity in the organization from P’s
perspective, and ii) a measure of the degree of contestation in the organization.
3Because of this one-to-one correspondence between missions and projects, we will use the terms
‘mission’ and ‘project’ somewhat interchangeably throughout the model.
4When two projects are funded, P’s payoff is the sum of payoffs of both projects minus wages
paid, whereas an agent’s payoff is the sum of payoffs of both projects plus his wage minus the cost
of his effort.
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We make the following assumptions on the cost function, the benefit parameters
b and B, the tolerance parameter τP , and on the dilution function D.
Assumption 1. The cost function C, the dilution function D, the benefit parame-
ters b and B, and the tolerance parameter τP satisfy the following conditions:
i b > D(2), C(0) = 0, and B >
D(1)
τP
ii 0 = C ′(0) < b < C ′(1)
iii C ′′ > b for all e ∈ [0, 1].
The first condition in Assumption 1, ensures that payoffs from projects are non-
negative for agents and the principal. This allows us to abstract from participation
considerations in the model. The second condition ensures interior solutions when
agents choose effort and ensures that a Nash equilibrium exists for the subgame
where agents choose effort. The third condition in Assumption 1 guarantees that
the equilibrium in the effort subgame is unique and stable.
Next, consider the set of feasible contracts. We assume that effort, the type
of project, and the outcome of a project are not verifiable. Thus the principal is
left with two contracting instruments. The first is a fixed wage w, which is paid to
agents by the principal immediately upon acceptance of the contract. We assume
that P faces a limited liability constraint given by w ≥ 0.
The second contracting instrument is the allocation of decision rights to fund
projects. We consider three possible cases. In the first case, which we call the
representative authority setting, P allocates decision rights to agents but does not
specify which agent, in particular, can make the decision. We assume that in this
case A1 has decision rights with probability
1
2
and A2 has decision rights with
probability
1
2
and the outcome of this lottery is realized after the project development
phase and before the funding phase of production. In the second case, P delegates
authority to the agents but also clearly specifies which of the agents has decision
rights. We call this the dominant group setting. Both of these cases can be described
by the variable q which is the probability of A1 having decision rights with q ∈
{0, 1
2
, 1}. The final case which we call an autocratic setting is where P retains
authority to make funding decisions.
Finally, the timing and information structure of the game is as follows.
1. P offers take-it-or-leave-it contracts to two agents (one agent with mission m1
and the other agent with mission m2) from the entire population of agents and
specifies the authority allocation.
2. A1 and A2 each accept or refuse the contract.
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3. If the contract was accepted by both, agents simultaneously select projects
(m˜1 and m˜2) to develop and effort levels (e1 and e2) to exert.
5,6
4. Outcomes for each project are realized.
5. The player with decision rights decides on funding projects.
6. Final payoffs are realized.
3 Benchmark- Effort and Projects Contractible and no
Limited Liability
For a benchmark, we consider a world where both effort and projects are contractible
and where there is no lower bound on wages paid to the agent. In this case, the
principal will choose a contract to maximize the total surplus of all players, since
he can simply extract the agents’ surpluses with w1 and w2 (as there is no longer a
limited liability constraint).
It follows that the principal will hire agents 1 and 2 such that m1 = m2 = mP to
develop a project that corresponds to the principal’s mission, mP . This maximizes
the total benefit to all parties whenever a successful project is implemented. The
optimal level of effort in this benchmark case is then set to maximize the total
expected surplus, TS,
TS = (e1 + e2 − e1e2(1− r))(B + 2b)− C(e1)− C(e2)
The first order conditions for an interior solution are
(1− e2(1− r)) (B + 2b) = C ′(e1)
(1− e1(1− r)) (B + 2b) = C ′(e2)
There are two key takeaways from this ideal contracting setting. First, coherence
is always optimal. Second, the contract ensures that agents internalize the benefits
of other parties. As we will see later, when P has fewer contracting instruments
there will be distortions along both of these dimensions.
4 Agent Authority- Equilibrium
We now turn to a setting where effort and projects (type or outcomes) cannot be
contracted on and where there is a limited liability constraint. We start with the case
5If either rejects the contract, all players receive their outside option.
6Thus a strategy in the subgame is an element from the space [0, 1]2.
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where agents have authority to fund projects. All that a contract can specify in this
case is a wage, and a probability q over decision rights. For most of the analysis, we
treat q (the probability that A1 has decision rights) as exogenous.7 That is, taking
q as given, we compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Hence, the game
is solved backwards: funding for successful projects is decided, projects and effort
levels are found as functions of agents’ missions, before turning to the principal’s
problem of who to hire at the start of the game and what wages to offer them.
4.1 Funding Projects
Consider the last stage of the game where project funding has to be decided. There
are four possible outcomes: (0, 0) where no projects are successfully developed,
(1, 0) where A1 successfully develops a project but A2 does not, (0, 1) where A2
successfully develops a project but A1 does not, and finally (1, 1) where both agents
are successful. Since any project funded yields positive payoffs to both agents, the
notion of real authority – where an agent’s selected project gets funded regardless
of who has formal authority – plays an important role here.8 For example, A1 has
real authority at the outcome (1, 0) where his selected project is always funded,
regardless of who has formal authority. Similarly, A2 has real authority at the
outcome (0, 1). And when r = 1, both agents have real authority at the outcome
(1, 1). Formal authority only matters when resources are scarce (r = 0) and when
the outcome (1, 1) is realized so that a choice has to be made between two successful
projects. In this case, the agent with authority will select the project that is closest
to his mission.
4.2 Project Development: Project Selection and Effort
We now solve for equilibrium project and effort choices. The following Lemma
examines the projects that agents select in equilibrium. The proofs of all the Lemmas
and Propositions in this paper are in the appendix.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, agents select projects which correspond to their own
missions.
Lemma 1 says that in equilibrium, agents select the projects m˜1 = m1 and
m˜2 = m2. To see why this is the case, notice that projects to the left of A1’s mission
and to the right of A2’s mission are strictly dominated for both A1 and A2. This is
because these projects lower an agent’s utility when he has authority and make it
less likely that his project gets picked if the other agent has authority. After deleting
these strategies, we can once again use the same argument to delete projects in the
7In a later section, however, we compare the representative authority and dominant group
settings in the limiting case where τP tends to infinity.
8Our use of the term real authority is slightly different from Aghion and Tirole (1997) where
projects are selected after effort is exerted.
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interval (m1,m2). The only projects that survive this iterated deletion of strategies
are m1 and m2.
Given Lemma 1 and the definition of ∆, we can write A1’s expected utility as
EUA1 = q(e1(1− e2)b+ (1− e1)e2(b−D(∆)) + e1e2(r(2b−D(∆)) + (1− r)b))
+(1−q)(e1(1−e2)b+(1−e1)e2(b−D(∆))+e1e2(r(2b−D(∆))+(1−r)(b−D(∆))))+w1−C(e1)
Similarly, we can write A2’s expected utility as
EUA2 = (1− q)((1− e1)e2b+ e1(1− e2)(b−D(∆)) + e1e2(r(2b−D(∆)) + (1− r)b))
+q((1−e1)e2b+e1(1−e2)(b−D(∆))+e1e2(r(2b−D(∆))+(1−r)(b−D(∆))))+w2−C(e2)
Rearranging, we get
EUA1 = e1(1− e2)b+ e2 (b−D(∆) + e1(rb+ (1− r)qD(∆))) + w1 − C(e1) (1)
EUA2 = (1−e1)e2b+e1 (b−D(∆) + e2(rb+ (1− r)(1− q)D(∆)))+w2−C(e2) (2)
Solving for the best response functions, we get
e1 = R1(e2; ∆) = C
′−1((1− e2)b+ e2(rb+ (1− r)qD(∆))) (BR1)
e2 = R2(e1; ∆) = C
′−1((1− e1)b+ e1(rb+ (1− r)(1− q)D(∆))) (BR2)
From the second and third conditions of Assumption 1, we know a Nash equilib-
rium exists and that it is unique and stable.9 Let e∗1 and e∗2 denote the equilibrium
level of effort. The following proposition shows when and how P can use ∆ as an
instrument to improve incentives for effort in the organization.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium,
i when resources are plenty (r = 1), efforts are independent of ∆.
9See Tirole (1988).
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ii when resources are scarce (r = 0), the probability of successfully developing at
least one project is strictly increasing in ∆.
Proposition 1 captures the main tradeoff in our paper and it is worth spending
some time on it. It says that heterogeneity across agents is a useful instrument to
provide incentives for effort if and only if resources are scarce in an organization. It
also helps us to interpret ∆ as a measure of contestation in the organization.
To see these points more clearly consider the table below which focusses on A1’s
incentives for effort across two outcomes: the outcome where A2 fails to develop a
project (this happens with probability (1− e2)) and the outcome where A2 success-
fully develops a project (this happens with probability e2).
Outcomes
A1’s Benefit
Net Benefit
A2 fails: 1− e2
(0, 0) (1, 0)
0 b
b
A2 succeeds: e2
(0, 1) (1, 1)
b−D(∆) b−D(∆) + rb+ (1− r)qD(∆)
rb+ (1− r)qD(∆)
First, consider the case where resources are plenty with r = 1. For this case, the
net benefit to A1 is b, regardless of whether A2 is successful or not. So there is no
strategic interaction between agents. As a result ∆ plays no role in incentives for
effort.
Second, consider the case where resources are scarce with r = 0. Here, A1’s net
benefit depends on whether A2 is successful or not. When A2 fails, A1’s incentives
to successfully develop his own project are very strong with a net benefit of b if he
is successful. But for the outcome where A2 is successful, A1 has an incentive to
free ride: A1’s net benefit from success does not depend on b. The larger e2 is, the
worse this problem gets. Now, ∆, turns out to be a valuable incentive instrument.
In particular, increasing ∆ has two effects. First, a larger ∆, makes mission less of
a public good and thus strengthens A1’s incentives when A2 succeeds. This can be
seen from the table above, where the net benefit when r = 0 is qD(∆). Second, and
more importantly, there is a strategic effect: A1 has an incentive to compete with
A2 to ensure that his preferred mission gets funded more often.
This strategic effect from increasing ∆ can be seen more clearly by looking at
an A1’s best response function when r = 0 below.
e1 = R1(e2; ∆) = C
′−1((1− e2)b︸ ︷︷ ︸
free riding
+ e2qD(∆)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contestation
)
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R1(e2;1)
R1(e2;0)
R2(e1;1)
R2(e1;0)
0 1
e1
1
e2
Figure 1: Best Response Functions for the Representative Authority Setting when
b = 5, C(e) = 5e2 and D(∆) = ∆.
Notice that the argument inside C ′−1 in his best response function can be split
into two parts. The first part, (1 − e2)b, captures the free riding effect: efforts of
both agents are strategic substitutes for this part. So as e2 gets larger, A1 has an
incentive to reduce his own effort and free ride. The second part, e2qD(∆), shows
why ∆ can be interpreted as mission contestation: when ∆ > 0 then efforts are
strategic complements for this part. So as ∆ gets larger, agents have a greater
incentive to compete with each other over scarce resources so that their preferred
mission gets implemented.
Figures 1 and 2 depict how heterogeneity across agents influences their effort
when b = 5, C(e) = 5e2 and D(∆) = ∆. In both figures, the solid red line is A1’s
best response to e2 when ∆ = 0 and the solid blue line is A2’s best response to e1
when ∆ = 0. Increasing ∆ then makes efforts less substitutable for both agents (see
the dashed lines) in the representative authority setting and for A1 in the setting
where he is the dominant agent.
4.3 Hiring
Having solved for project choice and effort, we can now turn to the principal’s
hiring decision. Define ∆1 ≡ |m1| and ∆2 ≡ |m2|. ∆1 measures the distance in
terms of preferences across P and A1 whereas ∆2 measures the distance in terms of
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R1(e2;1)
R1(e2;0)
R2(e1;0)
0 1
e1
1
e2
Figure 2: Best Response Functions for the Dominant Group Setting when b = 5,
C(e) = 5e2 and D(∆) = ∆.
preferences across P and A2.
Lemma 2. Hiring any pair of agents (m1,m2) where m1m2 > 0 is a strictly domi-
nated strategy. Thus in equilibrium ∆ = ∆1 + ∆2.
Put simply, Lemma 2 tells us that hiring two agents where both agents’ missions
are different from the principal and where their missions lie on the same side of the
principal’s, is never optimal. We can thus restrict our attention to those pairs of
agents where m1 ≤ 0 and m2 ≥ 0. Thus ∆ which we defined to be the distance
between the preferences of agents can be decomposed into the distance between A1
and P and the distance between A2 and P.
Given Lemma 2, P’s problem can be written as
max
∆1,∆2,w1,w2
EUP = e
∗
1(1− e∗2)(B −
D(∆1)
τP
) + (1− e∗1)e∗2(B −
D(∆2)
τP
)
+e∗1e
∗
2(r(2B−
D(∆1)
τP
− D(∆2)
τP
) + (1− r)(B− qD(∆1)
τP
− (1− q)D(∆2)
τP
))−w1−w2
subject to the following constraints:
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EUA1 ≥ 0 (IR1)
EUA2 ≥ 0 (IR2)
w1 ≥ 0 (LLC1)
w2 ≥ 0 (LLC2)
∆1 ≥ 0 (NN1)
∆2 ≥ 0 (NN2)
∆1 + ∆2 ≤ 1 (NN3)
Since the individual rationality constraints don’t bind in equilibrium, the prin-
cipal can offer wages of zero and still guarantee participation from both agents.
w1
∗ = w2∗ = 0
Let ∆∗ be the optimal level of ∆ chosen by the principal. We now state the
main proposition of the paper.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium
i when resources are plenty with r = 1, there is mission coherence with ∆∗ = 0.
ii when resources are scarce with r = 0, then for τP sufficiently large, there is
mission contestation with ∆∗ > 0.
The key tradeoff P faces is the following: heterogeneity can have incentive ben-
efits (by increasing the probability of a success) but the cost is that P is stuck with
a mission he cares less about. When resources are plenty there are no incentive
benefits from heterogeneity and so coherence is optimal. When resources are scarce
on the other hand, the incentive benefits from heterogeneity outweigh the dilution
in P’s benefits provided he is sufficiently tolerant of other missions. This tradeoff
can be seen more clearly by rearranging P’s expected utility as
(e∗1 + e
∗
2 − e∗1e∗2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of at least one success
B− D(∆1)e
∗
1(1− e∗2(1− q))
τP︸ ︷︷ ︸
dilution in P’s benefits from A1’s mission
− D(∆2)e
∗
2(1− e∗1q)
τP︸ ︷︷ ︸
dilution in P’s benefits from A2’s mission
(3)
When P is sufficiently tolerant, the incentive benefit from heterogeneity domi-
nates the cost of having a mission P cares less about. It is worth pointing out, that
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the convexity of the benefit dilution function plays no role in the Proposition above;
the result holds for any strictly increasing benefit dilution function.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal locations of the agents when
resources are scarce.
Proposition 3. Let r = 0 and suppose ∆∗ > 0. Then
i for the representative authority setting (q =
1
2
), it is optimal for P to hire agents
whose missions are equidistant from his mission.
ii for the case where A1 is the dominant agent (q = 1), ∆∗1 < ∆∗2. When D is
linear, ∆∗1 = 0.
iii for the case where A2 is the dominant agent (q = 0), ∆∗2 < ∆∗1. When D is
linear, ∆∗2 = 0.
The first part of Proposition 3 says that at the optimum both agents are spaced
equally apart from P in the representative authority setting. In fact, when D is
strictly convex, we can show that ∆∗1 = ∆∗2 is the unique optimum. The remaining
parts of the proposition say that in the dominant group setting, the agent with
decision rights (the dominant agent) must always be closer to P. Furthermore, when
D is linear, it is optimal for P to hire the dominant agent with a mission that is
exactly the same as P’s.
5 Agent Authority- Extensions
We now look at various extensions in the agent authority case. For all of these
extensions, we restrict our attention to a linear dilution function with D(∆) = ∆.
With this linear dilution function, we can rewrite (using Proposition 3) P’s expected
utility when r = 0 as
EUP = (e
∗
1 + e
∗
2 − e∗1e∗2)B − (1− e∗1q)e∗2
∆
τP
− w1 − w2
where we assume (without any loss of generality) that A1 has decision rights in
the dominant group setting. We can also rewrite the constraints (NN1)- (NN3) as
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1.
We first, look at comparative statics with respect to the parameters r, B and τP .
We then compare expected profits for P across the representative authority setting
and the dominant group setting for the limiting case where P is very tolerant of
missions other than his own. We also consider the problem of optimal organization
size. And finally we account for the fact that agents may have specialized skills and
show that our main results and insights still go through qualitatively.
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5.1 Comparative Statics
The following proposition summarizes comparative static results for the representa-
tive authority setting and the dominant group setting.
Proposition 4 (i). Let D(∆) = ∆. Then the optimal degree of mission contestation
∆∗ is
1. weakly decreasing in r for both the representative authority setting and the
dominant group setting.
2. weakly increasing in B for both the representative authority setting and the
dominant group setting.
3. weakly increasing in τP for the representative authority setting and is weakly
increasing in τP for the dominant group setting if C
′′ is sufficiently large.
To understand the proposition better it is worth emphasizing the tradeoff that P
faces once again. Increasing heterogeneity in an organization provides incentives for
agents to contest over scarce resources which leads to higher effort. But on the flip
side, P is stuck with a mission he cares less about. The comparative static results
above highlight this tradeoff. When resources are plenty, agents have no incentive
to contest over resources and so coherence is always optimal. When P’s intrinsic
benefit B is larger, the gains at the margin from contestation are higher leading to
a higher ∆∗. Finally, when P is more tolerant of other missions, the marginal cost
of being stuck with a different mission is lower. The condition that C ′′ is sufficiently
large ensures that P’s expected utility has strictly increasing differences in τP and
∆ in the dominant group setting.
5.2 Representative Authority versus Dominant Group
We now compare P’s expected utility across the representative authority and dom-
inant group settings when resources are scarce with r = 0. To do this, we simplify
our model in two ways. First, we use a specific functional form for the agent’s cost
function : C(e) =
ce2
2
. Second, we consider the limiting case where τP tends to in-
finity. This allows us to compare effort incentives across the representative authority
and dominant group setting with ∆∗ = 1.
In the analysis that follows, it is also useful to normalize the intrinsic motivation
parameter b.
Definition 2. bˆ ≡ b
c
.
The normalized parameter bˆ is a measure of the effective level of intrinsic moti-
vation for an agent. Notice from Assumption 1 that bˆ ∈ (2
c
, 1).
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Using (BR1) and (BR2), we can then write down the effort levels for the repre-
sentative authority setting with ∆∗ = 1 as
eR1
∗
= eR2
∗
= eR
∗
=
bˆ
bˆ+ 1− 1
2c
Let ρR∆=1 denote the probability of at least one success in the representative
authority setting when ∆ = 1. Thus
ρR∆=1 ≡ eR1
∗
+ eR2
∗ − eR1
∗
eR2
∗
=
bˆc(2c+ bˆc− 1)
(c+ bˆc− 1
2
)2
(4)
Similarly, using (BR1) and (BR2), we can then write down the effort levels for
the dominant group case with ∆∗ = 1 as
e∗1
D =
bˆ− bˆ2 + bˆ
c
1− bˆ2 + bˆ
c
e∗2
D =
bˆ− bˆ2
1− bˆ2 + bˆ
c
Once again, let ρD∆=1 denote the probability of at least one success in the domi-
nant group setting when ∆ = 1. Thus
ρD∆=1 ≡ eD1
∗
+ eD2
∗ − eD1
∗
eD2
∗
=
bˆ(bˆ+ c+ bˆc− 2bˆ2c+ 2c2 − 3bˆc2 + bˆ3c2)
(bˆ+ c− bˆ2c)2 (5)
The following proposition compares P’s expected utility across both the repre-
sentative authority setting and the dominant group setting when τP tends to infinity,
by comparing ρR∆=1 with ρ
D
∆=1.
Proposition 5. Let r = 0, D(∆) = ∆, and fix the parameter c in the agents
quadratic cost function. Then as τP tends to infinity, there exists a threshold
−
b in the
interval [
2
c
, 1) such that P prefers the dominant group setting over the representative
authority setting if and only if bˆ >
−
b.
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To understand Proposition 5 better it is useful to split the probability of at least
one success into two parts: a total effort term e1 + e2, and an asymmetry term
−e1e2. P prefers more total effort and he prefers efforts that are asymmetric. It
turns out that total effort is higher in the representative authority setting where
competition is symmetric. The dominant group setting on the other hand leads to
effort asymmetries which pushes the term −e1e2 towards 0. When the effective level
of motivation bˆ is large, free riding chokes the benefits of higher total effort in the
representative authority setting and P prefers to target asymmetric efforts instead
though the dominant group setting.
5.3 Endogenous number of agents
Given that free riding is a problem with multiple agents when resources are scarce,
it is natural to ask why a principal hires two agents instead of one when resources
are scarce with r = 0. In this subsection, we analyze a single agent setting which
is similar to Besley and Ghatak (2005). We first show that mission coherence is
always optimal in the single agent setting. We then find sufficient conditions under
which P prefers a single agent over two agents and the other way around. As in the
previous subsection, we assume that the agent has a quadratic cost function with
C(e) =
ce2
2
.
To study the single agent case, we retain all of the features of our model, except
now there is a single agent, A, instead of two agents, and this agent’s effort level is
given by e. The preferences of the principal and agent are given by
EUP = e
(
B − |mP − m˜|
λP
)
− w
EUA = e (b− |mA − m˜|) + w − c
2
e2
Once again, an agent with authority to fund projects will always develop a
project that corresponds to his preferred mission. So in equilibrium:
m˜ = mA
EUA = eb+ w − c
2
e2
The agent’s optimal level of effort is thus given by
e∗ =
b
c
= bˆ
P then seeks to maximize the following objective function:
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max
mA,w
e∗
(
B − |mA|
τP
)
− w
subject to the following constraints:
EUA ≥ 0 (IR)
−1 ≤ mA ≤ 1
w ≥ 0
Note that the agent can always guarantee himself a non-negative payoff by exerting
no effort. Since the participation constraint does not bind, the principal offers no
wage. Also notice that EUP is strictly decreasing in |mA| — contestation offers no
benefits in this setting. This implies the following proposition.
Proposition 6. In the single agent case, there is mission coherence.
In the single agent case, we observe that missions are perfectly aligned, consistent
with Besley and Ghatak (2005). Heterogeneity offers no benefit in the single agent
case, as there is no public goods problem which needs to be overcome. We also
observe that, even in the absence of free-riding, the agent exerts an effort level
below that which maximizes social surplus. This is driven by the fact he considers
only the private intrinsic benefit which will result from output, and does not consider
the gains the principal stands to make. Free-riding in the multi-agent setting adds
another ‘layer’ of inefficiency.
Given that the public goods problem only has bite in multiple agent settings,
one may ask why the principal would ever hire more than one agent. Indeed, effort
levels will necessarily decrease due to free-riding; however the total probability of at
least one project being successfully developed may be higher with two agents. We
now turn to this issue of organization size.
Proposition 7. Let r = 0, D(∆) = ∆, and fix the parameter c in the agents
quadratic cost function. Then in equilibrium,
i for bˆ sufficiently small (bˆ close enough to
2
c
), P prefers to hire two agents over
one agent.
ii for bˆ sufficiently large (bˆ close enough to 1), P prefers to hire one agent over
two agents.
The key tradeoff that P faces when he hires a second agent is that there is free
riding, but the benefit is that he gets an additional independent draw on a project.
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Figure 3: Comparing EUP across cases as τP tends to infinity. c = 3.6, B=1000.
When bˆ is sufficiently small, the independent draw effect dominates the free riding
effect and P prefers two agents over 1. On the other hand, when bˆ is sufficiently
large, the free riding effect dominates, and P prefers a smaller organization.
Figure 3 compares P’s expected utility across three different cases when r = 0
and as τP tends to infinity (so that ∆
∗ = 1 in the two agent case): the representative
authority setting (the red line), the dominant group setting (the blue line), and the
single agent case (the green line). In this example, c = 3.6 and B = 1000. We see
that for low values of bˆ close to
2
c
, the representative authority setting yields the
highest expected utility for P. For intermediate ranges, the dominant group setting
maximizes P’s expected utility, and finally when agents are very motivated (with bˆ
sufficiently close to 1), hiring a single agent is the best P can do (this maximizes the
probability of at least one success and has no costs because P’s preferred mission is
selected).
5.4 Specialization
So far in our model, we have assumed that each agent can select a project anywhere
on the project interval [−1, 1]. This assumption, while parsimonious, fails to accu-
rately describe many organizations where workers have specialized skills. We now
consider a setting where agents specialize in projects and show that all of our main
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insights from the previous section qualitatively go through.
The way we account for specialization in our model is to take the project interval
[−1, 1] and split it into two different intervals: the interval [−1, 0] from which only A1
can select a project (we call this interval A1’s interval) and a separate interval [0, 1]
from which only A2 can select a project (we call this interval A2’s interval). Each
project in each interval once again corresponds to a distinct mission. Within the
context of the NPS example earlier, think of a project in A1’s interval as developing
a conservation area which mainly requires research skills. And think of a project in
A2’s interval as developing a recreational facility which mainly requires engineering
skills. The degree of visitor interaction (and hence the environmental impact on the
park) increases as we move from the left to the right end of an interval and across
intervals.
In terms of payoffs, they remain the same as before, except that A1 gets an
additional benefit F1 ≥ 0 if a project from his own interval is funded and A2 gets
an additional benefit F2 ≥ 0 if a project from his own interval is funded. There are
two ways to interpret this fixed benefit. First, it could reflect occupational rewards
(both monetary and psychological) from the profession which the agent belongs to.
Second, these fixed benefits account for the discontinuity in missions when moving
from one interval to another.
Given this framework, we can once again show (as in Lemma 1) that in equilib-
rium agents select projects that correspond to their own mission. And once again,
when resources are plenty, heterogeneity plays no role in providing incentives for
effort. When resources are scarce, on the other hand, the best response function for
both agents can be written as
e1 = R1(e2; ∆, F1) = C
′−1((1− e2)(b+ F1) + e2(q(∆ + F1)))
and
e2 = R2(e1; ∆, F2) = C
′−1((1− e1)(b+ F2) + e1((1− q)(∆ + F2))).
As we can see, heterogeneity once again plays an important role in offsetting the
free riding problem by providing incentives for agents to compete with each other.10
6 Mission Structures in Government Agencies
We now use our theory to see if it helps us better understand observed mission
structures in organizations. Our focus is mainly on government agencies where the
role of mission has received a lot of attention. All of the case studies below are
drawn from James Q. Wilson’s book, Bureaucracy.
10The conditions for a unique and stable solution to exist are 0 = C′(0) < b+max{F1, F2} < C′(1)
and C′′ > b+max{F1, F2} for all e ∈ [0, 1].
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6.1 Mission Tolerance: τP
Perhaps the most natural interpretation of τP is that it reflects the landscape of
interests in the organization’s environment. Consider the example of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the United States. It is clear
that both industry and labor have a vested interest in the decisions made within
this organization, but these two interest-groups should not necessarily see eye-to-eye:
while workers will campaign for safer working conditions, industry may be reluctant
to implement costly changes. Since the OSHA always finds an ally in either indus-
try or labor in any decision it makes, we can argue it is relatively unconstrained
in terms of the actions it can take, and thus the missions it can target. Indeed,
mission contestation would explain the sometimes conflicting nature of the agency’s
decisions, and also its tendency to loosen regulations after introducing them.11 The
same is true for the National Park Service (NPS) which “searches for external allies
and engages in periodic changes in direction”.12
Of course, such pressures can also originate from within the agency. Whenever
management has strong views on the “right” way to accomplish the task at hand
(zealots, in the terminology of Downs (1967)), we should expect little to no appetite
for alternative methods, and thus observe mission coherence. This is certainly true
of the National Forest Service, where the founding executive Gifford Pinchot’s vision
of managing forest resources across multiple uses has left a deep and long-lasting
imprint on the culture of the organization. To this day, the NFS uses a variety of
methods – rigorous selection criteria, post-entry training, transfer and promotion,
and inspections – to ensure unity in values in the organization. This way it can be
sure that foresters working a far distance away from headquarters, do not succumb
to local influences and local pressures. As Wilson puts it, a coherent mission in the
NFS, prevents foresters in Boise from deferring wholly to mining interests, foresters
in Portland from deferring wholly to timber interests, and foresters in Santa Barbara
from deferring wholly to nature-lovers.13
A similar case can be made for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When
J. Edgar Hoover accepted directorship in 1924, he radically changed the direction of
the organization from, in the words of Wilson, “actively fomenting the Red Scare”
to “gathering facts about possible violations of federal laws”. To this end, Hoover
cleaned out the old agents, set up a training academy, and instituted an inspection
process which would ensure that all agents were cohering to the new mission. Later,
when Congress tried to force narcotics trafficking under the umbrella of the FBI,
Hoover actively resisted for fears that the Bureau would lose its reputation for
“integrity and efficiency” (i.e. its mission) due to the corruption scandals which
plagued the Drug Enforcement Agency.14
11Wilson., pp. 81-82.
12Wilson., pp. 64.
13Wilson., pp. 96-97.
14Wilson., pp. 182-183.
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Finally, a high τP can be interpreted as a setting where tasks are not clearly
specified in an organization. Consider the example of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) in the U.S., where workers are tasked with identifying firms engaging
in “unfair or deceptive methods of competition”. Since no clear guidelines are pro-
vided on what actually constitutes such behavior, we can make the case that the
organization has a high mission tolerance; officials have no strong preferences over
what action is taken, as long as it is in the interests of consumer welfare. What aca-
demics have observed within the agency is intense competition between two bodies
of workers: the lawyers, who are more inclined to pursuing cases where wrongdo-
ing is clearly evident and prosecution will be swift, and the economists, who are
more concerned with finding large concentrations of market power. The theory
would argue that this contestation is a natural response to that fact that “bettering
consumer welfare” is a goal which can be accomplished in many ways. As Wilson
puts it, the two contesting missions “are not simply professional preferences about
policy choices; they are competing visions... as to how best to discharge a public
responsibility”.15
6.2 Limited Resources: r
In our model, resource constraints arise because the principal has limited funds. As a
result, only a subset of successful projects can be implemented. An alternative, and
in our view more interesting, interpretation of resource constraints is that missions
may have multiple facets. And when these facets are not compatible with each other,
an organization can only focus on one facet at the expense of the other.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is an example of how resource
constraints arise from a mission with multiple facets.16 It has to keep out illegal
immigrants while at the same time letting in agricultural workers. It needs to
carefully screen foreigners who enter the country yet encourage tourism. And it
has to expel illegal immigrants without breaking up families. All of these goals
cannot be achieved together simultaneously: something has to give. This has led to
significant conflict over resources in the organization.
This tension between various facets of missions arises in several other organi-
zations. The National Park Service (NPS), yet another organization known for
mission contestation, has to “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic ob-
jects” whilst at the same time “providing for the [public’s] enjoyment” of parks.
Prisons have to confine inmates and reform and rehabilitate them and the State De-
partment is supposed to represent other countries to the United States and represent
the United States to other countries.
Resource constraints also arise from changes in technology. The United States
Air Force is an example.17 After the second world war, bomber pilots were the
15Wilson., pp. 61.
16Wilson., pp. 158.
17Wilson., pp. 105.
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dominant group in the air force and most of the resources were allocated towards
developing aircraft bombers. But with the development of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, the air force had to make a choice. It could ignore investing in missile
technology but at the cost of letting the army or the navy have the weapon of the
century. In the end, it decided to reallocate resources from bombers towards the
development of missiles.
6.3 Agent’s Intrinsic Motivation: bˆ
A prediction that arises from our analysis (Proposition 6 and 7) is that mission
coherence should be more likely when a worker’s intrinsic benefit from a mission
is high. In fact, most (though not all) of Wilson’s examples of mission coherence
involve “elite” organizations where the work is “exciting” or “glamorous”: these
include the FBI, and the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
Consider the United States Army Corps of Engineers which designs and over-
sees the construction of civil projects in the United States and military projects all
around the world: these projects include the Washington Monument, the Library of
Congress, the Panama Canal, the Pentagon and the Manhattan Project. Accord-
ing to Wilson, the corps portrays itself as “a prestige organization with exacting
standards and difficult duties”.18 Furthermore, performance standards are high and
members are supposed to confirm to strict codes of integrity. Given the elite nature
of this organization it is reasonable to assume that members derive a large intrinsic
benefit from their work. In fact, as Wilson suggests, the success of this organization
is largely because of the “strong sense of mission with which corps members are
imbued.” Similarly, we expect that the intrinsic benefit from being a “clean-cut,
aboveboard and nonpartisan” agent at the FBI, should be high.
Interestingly, both of these agencies, have also been reluctant to grow larger and
take on additional tasks and responsibilities. In the case of the Corps, it refused to
take on programs (as opposed to projects) such as disposing toxic wastes, improving
urban water distribution systems and enhancing management of coastal areas.19
Similarly, as noted earlier, the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover was averse to growing
larger by getting involved either in narcotics or organized crime. Our framework
provides one possible explanation for why these organizations chose not to expand:
when workers are highly motivated, smaller organizations perform better than larger
one’s where free riding is a problem.20
The table below summarizes the mission structure of agencies surveyed above,
along with the key parameters in our model which help in explaining the structure.
18Wilson., pp. 99.
19Wilson., pp. 190.
20Theories which suggest that bureaucrats maximize their agency size include Niskanen (1971)
and Tullock (1987).
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Mission Coherence Mission Contestation
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
(τP low, bˆ high) (τP high)
National Forest Service (NFS) Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
(τP low) (r low)
United States Army Corps of Engineers National Park Service (NPS)
( bˆ high) (τP high, r low)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) (τP high)
United States Air Force
(r low)
7 Autocratic Setting and Pandering
So far in our analysis, we have exogenously assumed that authority is always given
to an agent. Within the context of our examples, this appears to be a reasonable
assumption. In the case of the NFS, “most the responsibility for national forest work
is delegated down to the forest supervisors and forest rangers” (Kaufman (1960)).
The same is true of the U.S. Army Corps where “the field representative receives
little instruction regarding how to administer his task”.21 Furthermore, all of the
examples in the previous section involve professionals, who as Wilson puts it “bring
esoteric knowledge to their tasks”. So, there are factors outside of the model which
suggest that authority should be delegated to the agent. Nevertheless, it helps to
understand what happens in our framework when the principal has authority to
fund projects. We consider this autocratic setting in this section.
When resources are plenty with r = 1, the analysis in the autocratic case is
exactly the same as the delegation case with mission coherence being optimal for P.
Since P gets strictly positive benefits from any project in the interval [−1, 1], he funds
both projects whenever they are successful together. Where the analysis starts to
differ is when resources are scarce with r = 0. With scarce resources, P always funds
the project that is closer to his mission of 0. This in turn affects an agent’s incentives
in the project selection stage. In particular, in some settings agents will pander to
P by selecting a project closer to P in the project development subgame. Showing
that such a pandering equilibrium exists for the project development subgame for
certain pairs of agents hired, is the main result of this section.
21Wilson., pp. 166.
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To show how pandering arises, we proceed in exactly the same way as in the
case where agents have authority. We start with the funding phase where P selects
A1’s project if it is the only successful one, A2’s project if it is the only successful
one, and the project that is closer to his mission of 0 if both agents are successful (if
both projects are equidistant from P’s mission of 0, we assume that P picks either
project with a probability of half). Given , P’s funding decisions, agent i′s expected
utility is given by
EUi =

ei(b−D(|mi − m˜i|)) + ej(1− ei)(b−D(|mi − m˜j |))− C(ei) if |m˜i| < |m˜j |
ej(b−D(|mi − m˜j |)) + ei(1− ej)(b−D(|mi − m˜i|))− C(ei) if |m˜i| > |m˜j |
ei(1−
ej
2
)(b−D(|mi − m˜i|)) + ej(1−
ei
2
)(b−D(|mi − m˜j |))− C(ei) if |m˜i| = |m˜j |
We then move to the project development subgame. Lemma 3 characterizes the
strategies we are left with after iteratively eliminating strictly dominated strategies.
Lemma 3. Consider the autocratic case where P has authority to fund projects.
There is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to a project development
subgame where agent i selects projects in the interval connecting his mission mi and
0, and where ei ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 3 starts out exactly like Lemma 1. Agents never select projects that are
both further away from their own mission and P’s mission because it dilutes their
intrinsic benefit and reduces the chance that their project gets picked by P. But
unlike Lemma 1, agents may have an incentive in equilibrium to select projects dif-
ferent from their own mission and closer to P’s mission as the following Proposition
shows.
Proposition 8. Consider the autocratic case where P has the authority to fund
projects.
i Suppose m1.m2 ≥ 0. Then in equilibrium, agents develop projects that corre-
spond to their own mission.
ii Suppose m1.m2 < 0 with |m1| = |m2|. Then a pure strategy equilibrium does not
exist for the project development subgame. A mixed strategy equilibrium exists
for the project development subgame.
iii Suppose m1.m2 < 0 with |m1| 6= |m2|. Then an equilibrium exists for the project
development subgame.
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The main lesson from the first part of Proposition 8 is that P’s expected utility
when there is mission coherence is the same across both the delegation and the
autocratic cases. So if heterogeneity is optimal for P in the delegation case then
it also does better than coherence in the autocratic case. In this sense, our main
results on the benefits of heterogeneity continue to hold even after considering the
autocratic case.
The second part of Proposition 8, when combined with Lemma 3 says that
agents who are symmetrically spaced from P will always pander to P in equilibrium
by placing some weight on a mission that is not their own and that is closer to P’s
mission. The reason that no pure strategy equilibrium exists for this particular case
with symmetric spacing of agents around P, is the following. Agents (just as in a
Bertrand setting) have an incentive to undercut one another by selecting a project
closer to P’s mission of 0. But at the same time, agents have an incentive to ex-
ploit their residual monopoly power when they are the only ones with successfully
developed projects. And this incentive is strongest when agents develop exactly
the same project. This tension between pandering and enjoying monopoly power
ensures that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when agents missions are equidis-
tant from (though not identical to) P’s mission. Nevertheless, using arguments from
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a) and Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b), a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium exists where agents randomize over projects in between their own
mission and P’s mission of 0.
This now brings us to a comparison between the agent-authority case and the
autocratic case. When pure strategy equilibria exist in the project development
subgame in the autocratic case, the comparison is straightforward. From part (ii)
of Proposition 8, we know that if a pure strategy equilibrium exists with ∆ > 0
then it must be the case that one agent’s mission is closer to P’s mission relative
to the other agent. We can also show that in any pure strategy equilibrium in
the autocratic case, agents develop projects that correspond to their own missions.
Taken together, these points imply that P can do at least as well in the dominant
group setting relative to the autocratic case when we restrict our attention to pure
strategies.
For the case where only mixed strategies exist in the project development sub-
game, the comparison is more difficult. To see this, fix the missions of both agents.
There are then two clear forces that suggest that effort should be lower for the
autocratic case when compared to the delegation case. First, pandering dilutes an
agent’s intrinsic benefit which in turn reduces the marginal benefit from more effort.
Second, pandering also brings the projects of both agents closer to each other which
compounds the free riding problem, once again reducing effort. The only possible
offsetting force is that an agent may want to increase his effort when the other
agent randomizes. Unfortunately, without an explicit characterization of the mixed
strategy equilibrium, we are unable to say whether this offsetting force holds and if
it does what its magnitude is relative to the other two effects. This makes it difficult
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to draw a comparison between the delegation and autocratic case from P’s point of
view.
8 Conclusion
In many organizations, monetary incentives are not the entire story. Indeed, workers
often care about more than just money – they care about what their organization
does. In this paper we examine organizational mission as an incentive instrument.
Our main insight is that mission is a blunt incentive instrument when resources
are scarce; because mission is a public good, workers have an incentive to free
ride off one another. Heterogeneity in mission preferences – by making mission
more of a private good and by inducing competition across workers – re-sharpens
this instrument. We believe that this insight helps us better understand observed
mission structure in many organizations studied by political scientists and scholars
of public administration. We also think of our contribution as a step in the direction
to better understand conflict in organizations (March (1962)).
We conclude with two points. The first is a caveat. To make our main point
that heterogeneity (along with contestation) may be optimal in an organization, we
have focussed exclusively on a cost of coherence (free riding) and have abstracted
from other benefits of coherence and other costs of contestation. For example,
coherence may help in building a strong sense of identity amongst members of the
organization (Akerlof and Kranton (2008)). It may also provide clarity to members
when it comes to making decisions in the organization. On the flip side, contestation
provides incentives for workers to sabotage one other (Lazear (1989)). Though we
abstract from these issues in this paper, they must be taken into account when
trying to understand mission structure in organizations.
Our second point is on the scope of our paper. We have deliberately kept the
scope narrow by only studying mission oriented organizations. The advantage of
doing so is that we can draw on a large body of case studies in the public adminis-
tration literature to see how our theory matches up with the evidence. Nevertheless,
we believe that the central lesson from our model – that heterogeneity offers incen-
tive benefits through increased competition – applies to several other organizational
contexts where there are externalities across parties. Examples include competition
for resources across different divisions in a firm, or competition between members
of a cross-functional team. It would be interesting to see whether our viewpoint of
heterogeneity (and the competition that accompanies it) can generate useful testable
implication for understanding resource allocation in these settings.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let m˜1 be A1’s selected project and m˜2 be A2’s selected
project and let M˜i denote the project that is funded when resources are scarce,
when both projects are successful, and when agent i has authority. Consider A1.
His expected utility can be written as
EUA1 = e1(1− e2)(b−D(|m1 − m˜1|)) + (1− e1)e2(b−D(|m1 − m˜2|))
+e1e2(r(2b−D(|m1−m˜1|)−D(|m1−m˜2|))+(1−r)(q(b−D(|m1−M˜1|))+(1−q)(b−D(|m1−M˜2|))))−C(e1)
(A1)
Similarly for A2, we have
EUA2 = e1(1− e2)(b−D(|m2 − m˜1|)) + (1− e1)e2(b−D(|m2 − m˜2|))
+e1e2(r(2b−D(|m2−m˜1|)−D(|m2−m˜2|))+(1−r)(q(b−D(|m2−M˜1|)+(1−q)(b−D(|m2−M˜2|)))−C(e2)
(A2)
We now split the proof into a series of claims.
Claim 1: Any project-effort pair (m˜, 1) is strictly dominated by (m˜, 1 − ) for
 > 0 sufficiently small.
Proof of Claim 1: Consider A1. When r = 1 his expected marginal benefit
is given by
b−D(|m1 − m˜1|) (A3)
which is bounded above by b.
When r = 0, A1’s benefit from each outcome is bounded above by b and thus
the expected marginal benefit is also bounded above by b.
Since b < C ′(1) from Assumption 1, it follows that the marginal cost when e = 1
is strictly larger than the expected marginal benefit, and reducing effort by some
small amount  will result in a strict increase in expected utility for the A1.
Similar reasoning holds for A2.
Claim 2: Consider the reduced game obtained by deleting all strictly dominated
strategies identified by Claim 1. Then, for A1, any project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) with
e1 > 0 and with m˜1 < m1 or m˜1 > m2 is strictly dominated. Similarly, for A2, any
mission-effort pair (m˜2, e2) with e2 > 0 and with m˜2 < m1 or m˜2 > m2 is strictly
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dominated.
Proof of Claim 2: Consider the project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) with e1 > 0 for A1
and suppose m˜1 < m1. By keeping e1 fixed and selecting the project m1, A1 strictly
increases his utility for the outcome (1, 0), whereas his utility is at least as large for
other outcomes (since the project m1 is more likely to be picked over m˜1 by A2 and
since m1 is A1’s preferred project). Since e2 < 1 from Claim 1, it follows that the
expected utility to A1 from playing the strategy (m1, e1) is strictly larger than the
expected utility to A1 from playing (m˜1, e1).
Next, consider the project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) with e1 > 0 for A1 and suppose
m˜1 > m2. By keeping e1 fixed and choosing the project m2, A1 strictly increases
his utility for the outcome (1, 0), whereas his utility is at least as large for other
outcomes (since the project m2 is more likely to be picked over m˜1 by A2 and since
m2 yields higher benefits for A1 relative to m˜1). Since e2 < 1 from Claim 1, it
follows that the expected utility to A1 from playing the strategy (m2, e1) is strictly
larger than the expected utility to A1 from playing (m˜1, e1).
Similar reasoning holds for A2.
Claim 3: Consider the reduced game obtained by deleting all strictly dominated
strategies identified by Claim 1 and Claim 2. Take an agent with mission m. Any
project-effort pair (m˜, 0) is strictly dominated by the project-effort pair (m, ) for
some  > 0.
Proof of Claim 3: Consider A1. His expected utility from choosing (m˜, 0) is
given by
e2(b−D(|m1 − m˜2|)) (A5)
and if A1 plays the strategy (m1, ) with  > 0 then his expected utility is
(1− e2)b+ e2(1− )(b−D(|m1 − m˜2|))
+e2(r(2b−D(|m1 − m˜2|)) + (1− r)(qb+ (1− q)(b−D(|m1 − M˜2|)))−C() (A6)
When r = 1, the expression in (A6) is strictly greater than the expression in
(A5) if and only if b > 0 which always holds.
When r = 0, a sufficient condition for the expression in (A6) to be strictly greater
than the expression in (A5) is
(1− e2)b >
C()

=
C()− C(0)

(A7)
Since e2 < 1 from Claim 1 and since C
′(0) = 0, the inequality in (A7) holds for
 sufficiently small.
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Claim 4: Consider the reduced game obtained by deleting all strictly dominated
strategies identified by Claims 1-3. Then for A1, any project-effort pair (m˜1, e1)
where m1 < m˜1 ≤ m2 is strictly dominated by the project-effort pair (m1, e1). Sim-
ilarly, for A2, any project-effort pair (m˜2, e2) where m1 ≤ m˜2 < m2 is strictly
dominated by the project-effort pair (m2, e2).
Proof of Claim 4: Consider the project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) for A1 and suppose
m1 < m˜1 ≤ m2. By keeping e1 fixed and selecting the project m1, A1 strictly
increases his utility for the outcome (1, 0), whereas his utility is at least as large for
other outcomes (since m˜1 may have been closer to m2 than m˜2 and since m1 is A1’s
preferred project). Since effort is interior from Claims 1 and 3, it follows that the
expected utility to A1 from playing the strategy (m1, e1) is strictly larger than the
expected utility to A1 from playing (m˜1, e1).
Similar reasoning holds for A2.
Together, Claims 1-4 imply that the unique Nash equilibrium in the project-effort
game must be of the form {(m1, e1), (m2, e2)}, where 0 < e1 < 1, 0 < e2 < 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove this proposition for the case where q ∈
{1
2
, 1}. Similar reasoning holds for the case where q = 0.
i When r = 1, we can see from (BR1) and (BR2) that the efforts are independent
of ∆.
ii When r = 0, the derivative of the probability of at least one success is given by
(1− e∗1)e∗
′
2 (∆) + (1− e∗2)e∗
′
1 (∆) (A8)
where
e∗
′
1 (∆) =
D′(∆)(qe∗2C ′′(e∗2)− (1− q)e∗1(b− qD(∆)))
C ′′(e∗1)C ′′(e∗2)− (b− qD(∆))(b− (1− q)D(∆))
and
e∗
′
2 (∆) =
D′(∆)((1− q)e∗1C ′′(e∗1)− qe∗2(b− (1− q)D(∆)))
C ′′(e∗1)C ′′(e∗2)− (b− qD(∆))(b− (1− q)D(∆))
Consider two possible cases. First consider the representative authority setting
with q =
1
2
.
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Then e∗1 = e∗2 = e∗ and the expression in (A8) can be written as
2(1− e∗)e∗′(∆)
which is strictly positive for ∆ ∈ (0, 1) since C ′′ > b and since D is strictly
increasing in ∆.
Next consider the dominant group setting with q = 1. Since C ′′ > b and since
D is strictly increasing in ∆, it follows that e∗′1 (∆) > 0 and e∗
′
2 (∆) < 0 for
∆ ∈ (0, 1). Thus e∗1 ≥ e∗2 and it follows that
(1− e∗1)e∗
′
2 (∆) + (1− e∗2)e∗
′
1 (∆) ≥ (1− e∗2)(e∗
′
1 (∆) + e
∗′
2 (∆)) (A9)
Since C ′′ > b and since D is strictly increasing in ∆ it also follows for ∆ ∈ (0, 1)
that
e∗
′
1 (∆) + e
∗′
2 (∆) =
D′(∆)(e2(C ′′(e2)− b))
C ′′(e1)C ′′(e2)− (b−D(∆))b > 0
and thus the right and side of (A9) is strictly positive for ∆ ∈ (0, 1). 
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose to the contrary that m1 and m2 are strictly
negative. Consider hiring instead some pair of agents (m1 + ,m2 + ), where  is an
arbitrarily small positive number. Since ∆ is unchanged, effort levels are unchanged.
However, by Lemma 1, we know that the projects being developed are now both
closer to the principal’s mission. Hence, his surplus has strictly increased. Similar
reasoning holds when m1 and m2 are strictly positive. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
i When r = 1, effort does not depend on ∆ and thus heterogeneity has no benefits
for P in terms of effort. Since D is strictly increasing, it is optimal for P to hire
A1 and A2 with mA1 = mA2 = mP = 0. Thus ∆
∗ = 0.
ii Next, consider the case with r = 0. Suppose to the contrary that ∆∗ = 0. Then
P’s expected utility is
(e∗1(0) + e
∗
2(0)− e∗1(0)e∗2(0))B (A10)
Consider ∆′1 = ∆′2 =  =
∆′
2
where  ∈ (0, 1
2
]. Then P’s expected utility from
choosing ∆′1 and ∆′2 is
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(e∗1(∆
′)+e∗2(∆
′)−e∗1(∆′)e∗2(∆′))B−
1
τP
(D(∆′1)e
∗
1(∆
′)(1−e∗2(∆′)(1−q))+D(∆′2)e∗2(∆′)(1−e∗1(∆′)q))
(A11)
Since, the probability of at least one success is strictly increasing in ∆ (from
Proposition 1), it follows that for τP sufficiently large that the expression in
(A11) is strictly larger than the expression in (A10) which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
i Let q =
1
2
. P’s expected utility can then be written as
(2e∗ − e∗2)B − (D(∆
∗
1) +D(∆
∗
2))
τP
e∗(1− e
∗
2
)
Consider two possible cases. First, suppose D is linear. Then P’s expected profit
only depends on ∆. Thus setting ∆∗1 = ∆∗2 =
∆∗
2
is optimal for P.
Second, suppose D is strictly convex and suppose to the contrary that ∆∗ > 0
with ∆∗1 6= ∆∗2. Assume without any loss of generality that ∆∗1 > ∆∗2.
P can then choose ∆′1 = ∆′2 =
∆∗
2
. Since D is strictly convex, it follows that
D(∆′1) = D(
∆∗
2
) = D(
1
2
∆∗1 +
1
2
∆∗2) <
1
2
D(∆∗1) +
1
2
D(∆∗2)
and
D(∆′2) = D(
∆∗
2
) = D(
1
2
∆∗1 +
1
2
∆∗2) <
1
2
D(∆∗1) +
1
2
D(∆∗2)
Adding both inequalities, we get D(∆′1) + D(∆′2) < D(∆∗1) + D(∆∗2). Since,
agents’ efforts remain unchanged, P’s expected utility is strictly higher, which
is a contradiction.
ii Let q = 1 and suppose ∆∗ > 0. Consider two possible cases. First, suppose
∆∗1 > ∆∗2 at the optimum. Then P can choose ∆′1 = ∆∗2 and ∆′2 = ∆∗1. Since
∆′1 + ∆′2 = ∆∗, agents efforts are unchanged. Also since, e∗1 > e∗2 when ∆∗ > 0
(see the proof of Proposition 2), it follows from (3) that P’s expected dilution in
benefits is strictly lower, leading to a contradiction.
Second, suppose ∆∗1 = ∆∗2 at the optimum. Then P can choose ∆′1 = ∆∗1 − 
and ∆′2 = ∆∗2 +  for some small  > 0. Since ∆′1 + ∆′2 = ∆∗, agents efforts are
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unchanged. The difference in the expected dilution in benefits from P choosing
∆′1 and ∆′2 is given by
e∗1(D(∆∗1 − )−D(∆∗1)) + e∗2(1− e∗1)(D(∆∗2 + )−D(∆∗2))
τP
Since, e∗1 > e∗2 when ∆∗ > 0 (see the proof of Proposition 2), it follows that for
 sufficiently small the expression above is strictly negative. Thus P’s expected
dilution in benefits is strictly lower when he chooses ∆′1 and ∆′2, which is a
contradiction.
When D is linear, ∆∗1 = 0 minimizes the expected dilution in benefits since
e∗1 > e∗2.
iii The reasoning for the case with q = 0 is similar to part (ii).

Proof of Proposition 4:
i r: Follows directly from Proposition 2.
ii B: When r = 1, coherence is always optimal. When r = 0, notice that P’s
expected utility has strictly increasing differences in ∆ and B if and only if
e∗1 + e∗2 − e∗1e∗2 is strictly increasing in ∆ which we know is true for both the
representative authority and dominant group settings from Proposition 1.
iii τP : When r = 1, coherence is always optimal. When r = 0 and when q =
1
2
we
can write P’s expected utility as
(e∗1 + e
∗
2 − e∗1e∗2)(B −
∆
2τP
)
Notice that this function has strictly increasing differences in τP and ∆ if and
only if e∗1 + e∗2 − e∗1e∗2 is strictly increasing in ∆ which we know is true from
Proposition 1.
When r = 0 and q = 1, we need to show that (1 − e∗1)e∗2∆ is strictly increasing
in ∆ for P’s expected utility to have strictly increasing differences in τP and ∆.
Notice that
d((1− e∗1)e∗2∆)
d∆
= ∆((1− e∗1)e∗
′
2 (∆)− e∗2e∗
′
1 (∆)) + (1− e∗1)e∗2
This derivative is strictly positive for all ∆ ∈ (0, 1) if
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(1− e∗1)e∗2 > e∗2e∗
′
1 (∆)− (1− e∗1)e∗
′
2 (∆)
We can rewrite the above inequality as
C ′′(e∗1)C
′′(e∗2)− (b−∆)b >
e∗2C ′′(e∗2)
(1− e∗1)
+ b
which can be rearranged as
C ′′(e∗1) >
b2 + b(1−∆)
C ′′(e2)
+
e∗2
1− e∗1
Since
e∗2
1− e∗1
is bounded above by
1
1− C ′−1(b), it follows that for C
′′ sufficiently
large, the inequality above holds.
Proof of Proposition 5: Since τP tends to infinity in the limit, we only need
to focus on the probability of at least one success for both cases. Notice that we
can then write ρD∆=1 − ρR∆=1 as22
bˆ[
1
4
c+
1
4
bˆ− 3
4
bˆc− 1
2
bˆ2c+
1
4
bˆc2 + bˆ2c2 +
1
4
bˆ3c2 − 1
2
c2]
(bˆ+ c− bˆ2c)2(c+ bˆc− 1
2
)2
(A12)
From (A12), it follows that the dominant group setting yields higher profits for
P if and only if
1
2
(1− 2
c
) <
bˆ3
4
+ bˆ2(1− 1
2c
) +
bˆ
4
(1− 3
c
+
1
c2
) (A13)
Taking limits as b tends to c so that bˆ tends to 1, we can rewrite the right hand
side of (A13) as
1
2
+ 1− 1
2c
(1 +
3
2
) +
1
4c2
which is strictly larger than the left hand side of (A13).
Also, notice that the derivative of the right hand side of (A13) with respect to bˆ
is
3
4
bˆ2 + 2bˆ(1− 1
2c
) + 1− 3
c
+
1
c2
22We used mathematica to simplify this expression.
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which is strictly positive for bˆ >
2
c
and c > b. Thus there exists a threshold
−
b ∈ [2
c
, 1) such that P prefers the dominant group setting over the representative
authority setting if and only if bˆ >
−
b .
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider the first part of Proposition 1. The prob-
ability of a success in the single agent case is given by bˆ whereas the probability
of at least one success in the two agent case when there is mission coherence (with
∆ = 0) is
bˆ(bˆ+ 2)
(1 + bˆ)2
. The probability of at least one success is higher in the two agent
case with coherence if and only if
bˆ(bˆ+ 2)
(1 + bˆ)2
> bˆ
which can be rewritten as
1 > bˆ+ bˆ2
Since contestation may be preferred by P over coherence in equilibrium, it follows
that for bˆ small enough so that the above inequality holds, P strictly prefers two
agents over one agent.
Next, consider the sufficient condition for P to prefer one agent over two agents.
Once again the probability of a success in the single agent case which is given by bˆ
is higher than the probability of at least one success in the two agent case where ∆
is set at 1 if and only if
bˆ > max{ρR∆=1, ρD∆=1}
First, consider the term ρR∆=1. As bˆ tends to 1, ρ
R
∆=1 tends to
c(3c− 1)
(2c− 0.5)2. Notice
that
c(3c− 1)
(2c− 0.5)2 < 1 if and only if c(c− 1) +
1
4
> 0, which always holds since c > 2
from parts (i) and (iii) of Assumption 1.
Next, consider the term ρD∆=1. As bˆ tends to 1, ρ
D
∆=1 also tends to 1. Taking the
derivative of ρD∆=1 with respect to bˆ, we get
−c[(3bˆ
2(1− 2c)c+ 2bˆ3(c− 1)c− c(1 + 2c) + bˆ(6c2 − 1)]
(bˆ+ c− bˆ2c)3
Taking limits of the expression above as bˆ tends to 1, we get c > 2. Since bˆ and
ρD∆=1 both tend to 1 as bˆ tends to 1 and since ρ
D
∆=1 has a steeper slope than bˆ as bˆ
tends to 1, it follows that bˆ > ρD∆=1 for bˆ sufficiently close to 1. 
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Proof of Lemma 3: The proof is split into a series of claims.
Claim 1: Any project-effort pair (m˜, 1) is strictly dominated by (m˜, 1 − ) for
 > 0 sufficiently small.
Proof of Claim 1: Consider A1. When r = 0, A1’s benefit from each outcome is
bounded above by b and thus the expected marginal benefit is also bounded above
by b. Since b < C ′(1) from Assumption 1, it follows that the marginal cost when
e = 1 is strictly larger than the expected marginal benefit, and reducing effort by
some small amount  will result in a strict increase in expected utility for the A1.
Similar reasoning holds for A2.
Claim 2: Consider the reduced game obtained by deleting all strictly dominated
strategies identified by Claim 1. Then, for A1, any project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) with
e1 > 0 and with |m˜1| > |m1| or m˜1.m1 < 0 is strictly dominated. Similarly, for A2,
any mission-effort pair (m˜2, e2) with e2 > 0 and with |m˜2| > |m2| or m˜2.m2 < 0 is
strictly dominated.
Proof of Claim 2: Consider the project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) for A1 with e1 > 0 and
suppose |m˜1| > |m1|. By keeping e1 fixed and selecting the project m1, A1 strictly
increases his utility for the outcome (1, 0), whereas his utility is at least as large for
other outcomes (since the project m1 is more likely to be picked over m˜1 by P and
since m1 is A1’s preferred project). Since e2 < 1 from Claim 1, it follows that the
expected utility to A1 from playing the strategy (m1, e1) is strictly larger than the
expected utility to A1 from playing (m˜1, e1).
Next, consider the project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) for A1 with e1 > 0 and suppose
m˜1.m1 < 0. By keeping e1 fixed and choosing the project 0, A1 strictly increases
his utility for the outcome (1, 0), whereas his utility is at least as large for other
outcomes (since the project 0 is more likely to be picked over m˜1 by P and since 0
yields higher benefits for A1 relative to m˜1). Since e2 < 1 from Claim 1, it follows
that the expected utility to A1 from playing the strategy (0, e1) is strictly larger
than the expected utility to A1 from playing (m˜1, e1).
Similar reasoning holds for A2.
Claim 3: Consider the reduced game obtained by deleting all strictly dominated
strategies identified by Claim 1 and Claim 2. Take an agent with mission m. Any
project-effort pair (m˜, 0) is strictly dominated by the project-effort pair (m, ) for
some  > 0.
Proof of Claim 3: Consider A1. His expected utility from choosing (m˜, 0) is
given by
e2(b−D(|m1 − m˜2|)) (A14)
and if A1 plays the strategy (m1, ) with  > 0 then his expected utility is
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(1− e2)b+ e2(1− )(b−D(|m1 − m˜2|))
+e2(b−D(|m1 − M˜P |))− C() (A15)
where M˜P is the project selected by P when both projects are successful.
When r = 0, a sufficient condition for the expression in (A15) to be strictly
greater than the expression in (A14) is
(1− e2)b >
C()

=
C()− C(0)

(A16)
Since e2 < 1 from Claim 1 and since C
′(0) = 0, the inequality in (A16) holds for
 sufficiently small.
Together, Claims 1-3 imply that, when P has authority, there is no loss of gener-
ality in restricting our attention to a project development subgame where agent i se-
lects projects in the interval connecting his mission mi and 0, and where ei ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 8:
i Without any loss of generality, assume that m1 ≥ 0 and m2 ≥ 0 and consider
two possible cases.
First, suppose mi = 0 for some agent, let us say A1. Then it is strictly dominant
for A1 to select the project 0, because this project yields the maximum benefit
to him and since the project corresponding to 0 is most likely to be selected by
P when both A1 and A2 are successful. Given A1 selects 0, A2’s best response is
to select the project m2, since that maximizes his benefit for the outcome (0, 1)
and since the project 0 gets selected anyway whenever A1 is successful.
Second, supposem1 > 0 andm2 > 0. Consider the project-effort pair (m˜1, e1) for
A1 and suppose 0 ≤ m˜1 < m1. We will show that (m˜1, e1) is strictly dominated
by the project-effort pair (m1, e1).
To see this, note that by keeping e1 fixed and selecting the project m1, A1 strictly
increases his utility for the outcome (1, 0), whereas his utility is at least as large
for other outcomes (since m˜1 may have been closer to 0 than m˜2 and since m1 is
A1’s preferred project). Since efforts are interior from Lemma 3, it follows that
the expected utility to A1 from playing the strategy (m1, e1) is strictly larger
than the expected utility to A1 from playing (m˜1, e1).
Similar reasoning holds for A2.
Thus the unique Nash equilibrium in the project-effort game must be of the form
{(m1, e∗1), (m2, e∗2)} where e∗1 and e∗2 satisfy (BR1) and (BR2).
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ii Suppose to the contrary that a pure strategy equilibrium exists where A1 plays
(m˜1, e1), and A2 plays (m˜2, e2) with m˜1 ∈ [m1, 0], m˜2 ∈ [0,m2] and with 0 <
e1 < 1 and 0 < e2 < 1.
Consider four possible cases. First, suppose m1 ≤ m˜1 < 0 and 0 < m˜2 ≤ m2
with |m˜1| = |m˜2| > 0. A1’s expected utility is then
EUA1 = e1(1−
e2
2
)(b−D(|m1 − m˜1|)) + e2(1−
e1
2
)(b−D(|m1 − m˜2|))− C(e1)
By deviating and selecting (m˜1 + , e1) where  > 0, A1’s expected utility is then
given by
EU ′A1 = e1(b−D(|m1 − (m˜1 + )|)) + e2(1− e1)(b−D(|m1 − m˜2|))− C(e1)
The gain from the deviation is then
e1(D(|m1 − m˜1|)−D(|m1 − (m˜1 + )|)) +
e1e2
2
(D(|m1 − m˜2|)−D(|m1 − m˜1|))
For  sufficiently small, the expression above is strictly positive and thus the
strategies cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Second, suppose m˜1 = m˜2 = 0. Then A1 can deviate and choose (m1, e1). He
does strictly better for the outcome where he is the only one successful whereas
his payoffs for all other outcomes remain unchanged. Since 0 < e1 < 1 and
0 < e2 < 2, the expected gain in utility from this deviation is strictly positive.
Third, suppose |m˜1| < |m˜2|. By deviating to (m˜1 − , e1), where  > 0, A1 does
strictly better for the outcome where he is the only one who is successful. And
when  is sufficiently small, A1’s project still gets picked over A2’s project when
both agents are successful, and yields a higher payoff for A1 for that particular
outcome. Since 0 < e1 < 1 and 0 < e2 < 1, the expected gain in utility from
this deviation is strictly positive.
In the final case, |m˜1| > |m˜2|. The reasoning to rule this case out as a pure
strategy equilibrium is exactly the same as that of case 3.
Thus a pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist when m1 < 0, m2 > 0 with
|m1| = |m2|.
Next, to show that an equilibrium exists, it is sufficient to verify that the fol-
lowing conditions (see Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a)) hold. The
method of proof is very similar to a proof for the existence of an equilibrium in
a duopoly setting where firms choose both prices and quantities simultaneously
(see Gertner (1981)).
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(a) Agents expected utilities are bounded. This condition is satisfied because
EUAi is bounded above by b and bounded below by 0.
(b) The strategy profiles at which payoffs are discontinuous for an agent are of
smaller dimension than that of the strategy profile space. This condition
holds since discontinuities occur only when projects are equidistant from
P’s mission of 0.
(c) The sum of payoffs of both agents is upper semi-continuous in the strategy
profiles. This condition is satisfied because EUA1 + EUA2 is continuous in
the strategy profiles.
(d) Agents payoffs are weakly lower semi-continuous in their strategies. Since
selecting a project closer to 0, discontinuously increases profits, payoffs are
left lower semi-continuous and thus also weakly lower semi-continuous.
iii The proof is similar to the last part of part (ii) above.

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